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NOTES
PREGNANT DRUG ABUSERS ARE TREATED
LIKE CRIMINALS OR NOT TREATED AT
ALL: A THIRD OPTION PROPOSED
Anne S. Kimbel

INTRODUCTION

For some Americans, and disproportionately for minorities, poverty
is a cold and familiar state.1

From early childhood to perhaps

adulthood, the poor know financial insecurity and crisis. They grow up
yearning for comfort and security, only to be disappointed. They
suffer the constant disruption to family life so understandably
consistent in homes where there simply is not enough money to pay
the bills.2 Eventually, and often too early, they become aware that
3
they are poor and at risk and that they are likely to stay that way.
Indeed, many poor children never find their way out of their
impoverished world. They often receive substandard education at
their local public schools, and the utility of that education is hampered
by the stress of adult concerns at a very young age.5

1. U.S. Population Statistics Disaggregated by Race and Gender, U.S.
Population Below Poverty Level By Race, Gender, & Age, March 1995,
[hereinafter Poverty Level By Race] at http://www.maec.org/stats.html (indicating
that 44.3% of black females under the age of 18 and 33.7% of black females of all
ages live below the poverty line compared with 12.7% of white females under 18
and 10.7% of white females of all ages, 12.2% of white males under 18 and 8% of
white males of all ages, 43.3% of black males under 18 and 27.8% of black males of
all ages).
2. Deborah L. Cohen, New Study Links Lower I.Q. at Age 5 to Poverty,
EDUCATION WEEK 12, 29 April 1993 (describing a study in which a strong link was
found between persistent childhood poverty and unrealized intellectual potential).
3. See Poverty Level by Race, supra note 1.
4. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,
Schools and Staffing Survey (1993-94)[hereinafter "Teacher Questionnaire"],
availableat http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/ce/c0657a01.html :
Students at public secondary schools with a high poverty level (more than
40 percent of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch) were less
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The poor often find solace in the use of mood-altering chemicals.6
Just as the stereotypical businessman "winds down" with a martini or
two before dinner, the poor of America find mental release from their
rough days,7 and often the poor person's drug of choice is cocaine,8
particularly in its concentrated and relatively inexpensive form, Crack. 9
Crack is smoked; the inhaled drug is transferred directly from the
lungs to the bloodstream, generating instant effect.'0
This highly
efficient route of administration yields an immediate and intense
effect, arguably making Crack the most addictive substance in current
use." Scientists have researched and described a biological basis for
the rapidity of the onset
of Crack addiction, pinpointing a
• 12
neurochemical explanation for the nearly unbearable withdrawal

likely to be taught any of the core subjects by a teacher who majored in
that subject than were students at public secondary schools with a low
poverty level (5 percent or less eligible for free or reduced-price lunch).
Id.
5. See Cohen, supra note 2. The author's review of the data yields the
conclusion that "there is little doubt that child poverty...is scarring the
development of our nation's children." Id.
6. The National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information, Research
Shows Impact of Poverty on Substance Abuse Among Youth (August 1, 1997),
available at http://www.health.org/newsroom/rep/30.html
(describing
an
overrepresentation of drug abuse in the poor).
7. Id.(stating "[p]oor people often turn to drugs for relief from anxiety and
stress").
8. The National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information, Substances
of Abuse - Brief Profiles /hereinafter "Brief Profiles"], Cocaine available at
http://www.health.org/govpubs/rpo926 reporting that cocaine is abused because it
induces "carefree feeling, euphoria, relaxation, in control" sensations, but that
"high lasts only about 5 to 20 minutes" and "may cause severe 'mood swings' and
irritability" and describing development of tolerance that causes requirement of
increasing doses to achieve desired effect.
9. See id.
10. New Research Reveals How Drugs, Alcohol Affect Parts of Brain,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 2001 [hereinafter "Brain Research"].
11.

Id.

12. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 65 (6th ed., 2000). Cocaine blocks the
reabsorption of neurotransmitters (mood creating chemicals) particularly
dopamine, in the synaptic cleft. This results in a buildup of chemical that induces
very pleasurable sensations. The effect lasts 10 to 30 minutes, and the exhaustion
of the neurotransmitter supplies causes subsequent craving. Id.

2003]

PregantDrug Abusers Are Treated Like Criminals

syndrome that virtually removes from the addict the choice to refrain
from drug use, 3 even in the face of severe negative consequences.
In 1989, the Maternal Child Health Unit of the Medical University
of South Carolina (MUSC) noted an increased occurrence of negative
health effects on fetuses and newborn babies which was believed to be
caused by maternal ingestion of cocaine. 4 MUSC's health care team
noted that the patients who were using cocaine during pregnancy were

also seeking prenatal care and labor and delivery services." The team
did not assume that the women who used drugs while pregnant simply
disregarded the effects of drugs on their fetuses. Instead, the team
recognized the women's maternal concern and responsibility for their
fetuses and both provided prenatal care and referred these women for
substance abuse treatment16 through a policy that included the
notification of law enforcement when a patient's urine tested positive
for cocaine."' The policy was described by Solicitor Charles Condon as
"amnesty-based [with] basic requirements, number one being drug
free, ... and, number two, if you would go to free drug treatment, not a
thing would happen to you."' 8
This Note argues that the MUSC staff's recognition of the dangerous
activity in which their patients were engaged and the subsequent
intervention on behalf of those patients was justified and necessary to
prevent harm. 9 However, the use of arrest to coerce compliance with
treatment served little purpose in meeting either the short term goal of
a safe and healthy course of pregnancy ° or the long term goal of the
13. See Brain Research, supra note 10. The article reports research showing
biological basis for addiction, tolerance, withdrawal, and relapse. MRI and PET
scans of the brain reveal brain activity during highs and lows, illustrating why
withdrawal can be unbearable and demonstrating that changes that addictive drugs
cause in the brain that persist long after use ends.
14. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 474,478 (4" Cir. 1999).
15. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 211 (2001).
16. Id. at 211-12.
17. Id. at 474.
1& Id. at 475.
19.

See generally TOM BEAUCHAMP AND JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF

Press ed., 5" ed. 2001). The authors describe
societal obligation to protect persons against some types and levels of harm and
suggests a "short step to the conclusion that a positive obligation exists to provide
benefits such as health care." Id. at 157-58.
20. For a concise and persuasive prediction of the chilling effect such a policy
could have on the degree to which pregnant women seek prenatal care, see Brief of
Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al., Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, (Oxford Univ.
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mother's release from drug dependence.2
This Note contends,
however, that cocaine abuse by pregnant women who wish to carry
their fetuses to term merits attention and intervention by the medical
staff.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston22 presents an opportunity for the
American medical and legal systems to tailor a response to the effects
of poverty and drugs on some of our most vulnerable citizens, pregnant
women and their unborn children. The case presents an opportunity to
acknowledge the disparity between the life choices available to the
poor in America and those available to the middle and upper class.
Indeed, the Ferguson amicus brief contended that drug testing
threatened the autonomy of pregnant women and observed that this
policy would disproportionately affect poor and minority women, since
they are "more likely to give birth at public institutions and have more
contact with state agencies. 2 3 To view the case as a question of a
woman's right to privacy versus the state's right to search is to abandon
pregnant drug users as mere props in an exercise of constitutional
analysis.
Ferguson beckons society to recognize its obligation to create a
solution that serves the interests of the individual and of society. It
also emphasizes that the solution should entail neither arrest nor
neglect. The parens patriaepower, the "state's inherent sovereignty to
safeguard the community's welfare,, 24 permits society, through its
legislature, to choose to protect the interests of minors and
25
incompetents.
The degree of dependence and loss of competent choice suffered by
the women was manifested in their contradictory behavior: they used
cocaine while pregnant despite the desire to safely carry and birth their
fetuses. 6 Such contradictory behavior indicates a level of dependence
and a lack of control that yields a nearly hopeless prognosis for

21. Brain Research, supra note 10. The author describes Crack cocaine as
magnifying the addictive qualities of snorted cocaine. Treatment is described as
requiring the disruption of an addict's pattern of binges and concerted attention to
relapse prevention. The Court also notes that treatment is often complicated by
underlying social problems.
22. Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67..
23. See Amici brief,supra note 20.
24. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 27 (2000).
25. See id.
26.

See Brain Research,supra notes 10.
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recovery without intense and sustained intervention.27 The parens
patriaepower provides an avenue by which specialized treatment could
be offered as a viable alternative to either incarceration or
abandonment of the women to their addiction in the name of privacy.
This Note first examines the socioeconomic forces that contribute to
the incidence of drug use during pregnancy. It next considers the issue
of consent, looking at the patient's consent to the search through urine
drug testing as separate from consent regarding the release of medical
information to law enforcement. This Note then explores the health
care rationale for the course of action taken by MUSC. Finally, it
proposes that each state invoke its parens patriae power to devise a
socio-medical policy for effective and constitutional intervention on
behalf of the patients.
I.

FERGUSON V. CITY OF CHARLESTON

MUSC developed a policy for intervening in women's illicit drug use
during pregnancy. First, pregnant cocaine users were identified
through urine drug testing 28 of women whose clinical evaluation 9
revealed the presence of particular predetermined indicia of cocaine
abuse. 30 The staff then encouraged those women to seek substance

27. Id.
28. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474.
29. It is routine nursing care to assess every obstetrical patient for risk factors
of which the treatment team must be aware to assist the mother with the safe and
healthy pregnancy and delivery. The absence of risk indicators results in the lesser
intensity of assessment. The presence of a risk factor(s), however, elicit(s)
intensified investigation and assessment to create a complete and accurate clinical
picture to allow the treatment team to plan for potentially needed intervention.
See, e.g., SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL COUNTIES REGIONAL PERINATAL SYSTEM,
FUNDAMENTALS OF LABOR, DELIVERY & RECOVERY NURSING, Antepartum Care
and Assessment 55 (1999).
30. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474, (describing indicia as:
(1) separation of the placenta from the uterine wall;
(2) intrauterine death;
(3) no prenatal care (fewer than five visits);
(4) late prenatal care (beginning after 24 weeks)
(5) incomplete prenatal care (fewer than five visits);
(6) preterm labor without obvious cause;
(7) a history of cocaine use;
(8) unexplained birth defects;
(9) intrauterine growth retardation without an obvious cause).
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abuse treatment.3 The testing policy was created in consultation with
governmental entities who exercised authority based on statute 32 and
case law33 and proffered solutions that supported the state's interest in
the well being of the fetuses. These parties included the Solicitor of
the Ninth Judicial Circuit of South Carolina, the South Carolina Police
Department, the City of Charleston and several social services
34
agencies.
Ten women, most of whom were black35 and all of whom had been
subjected to the drug testing policy, filed suit in the United States
36
District Court for the District of South Carolina. The women claimed
disparate impact in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d, since the majority of those subjected to the state's action (at
the state hospital) were African-American women. The Court of
Appeals found that the women had failed to show the existence of an
equally effective alternative means of accomplishing policy goals that
would impose a less disparate impact on African Americans.3 7
The women also alleged a violation of the right to privacy and abuse
of process. The court found that a privacy right was not violated since
the women's medical records were disseminated to a limited number of

31. Id. at 473 (describing the policy as "intended to encourage pregnant
women whose urine tested positive for cocaine use to obtain substance abuse
counseling") and at 475 (referring to J.A. 2739 finding that the "goal [of the policy]
was not to arrest patients but to facilitate their treatment and protect both the
mother and unborn child").
32. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-50 (2000). Unlawful conduct towards child has been
interpreted to include abuse and endangerment through the use of crack cocaine
during pregnancy. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778-84 (S.C. 1997), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1145, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1104, 118 S Ct. 1857 (1998) (upholding a
criminal child neglect conviction of a woman who ingested cocaine while pregnant
with a viable fetus).
33. See State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984) (holding that a viable
fetus was a person for criminal law purposes under South Carolina law) and State
v. Jenkins, 294 S.E.2d 44 (S.C. 1982) (interpreting the statute's noninclusion of
"knowingly" or
similar language regarding intent as demonstrating the
legislature's intent that the simple failure to provide care so that the life, health
and comfort of a child is endangered or likely to be endangered is a violation of
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-50).
34. Ferguson,186 F.3d. at 473.
35. Id. at 479, n.9 ("[o]f the ten Appellants, eight are African-American, one is
of mixed race, and one is Caucasian).
36. Id. at 469.
37.

Id. at 481-82.
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law enforcement personnel.
The court also found that MUSC
personnel did not have the requisite improper ulterior purpose
necessary to establish abuse of process.38
The women further asserted the urine drug testing was a violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights39 because law enforcement was
notified of their positive drug test results. Indeed, as a result of the
notification, four of the women were arrested; however, none of the
women was prosecuted. 40
The District Court found the women had consented to the search by
consenting to urine testing.4' The women appealed this judgment,
arguing the evidence supporting the jury's consent finding was
insufficient.42
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment without
reaching the consent issue. The court, instead, reasoned that, "the
rising use of cocaine by pregnant women among MUSC's patient base
and the public health problems associated with maternal cocaine use
created a special need beyond normal law enforcement goals., 43 The
special needs doctrine is a limited exception to the requirement of
probable cause in which reasonableness is evident from "a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests."44
For cases in which a special need is identified from the facts, the
Supreme Court has set out a balancing test weighing governmental
interests against individual privacy interests "to assess the practicality
of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular
context., 45 This balancing test is extremely fact sensitive and is
performed by assessing the facts in light of the surrounding
circumstances with attention to differences of degree.

38. Id. at 483.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (addressing citizen's right to be free from
unreasonable searches).
40. Ferguson,532 U.S. at 67.
41. Ferguson, 186 F.3d 469.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 479.
44. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602,
619 (1989) (allowing exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
for searches made "when special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable").
45. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477-79 (detailing the three-prong test for Special
Need Doctrine applicability).
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To justify waiver of the probable cause-warrant requirement,
governmental need must be sufficiently important that the search as it
was performed is justified in light of the surrounding circumstances,
taking into consideration "other factors that show the search to be
relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.
Next, the
expected effectiveness of the search is scrutinized with focus on "the
degree to which [it] advances public interest."4 7 Finally, the degree of
intrusion is first measured objectively by the duration and intensity of
the seizure and investigation. It is then measured subjectively by the
amount48 of fear and surprise experienced by the searched or detained
person.
The Fourth Circuit applied the special needs balancing test4 9 to the

urine testing policy at MUSC. First, it found that the policy advanced
the public interest' ° by assisting in providing the women with the safe
52
51
delivery and birth they sought as well as protecting the fetus.

Second, it held that it was an effective and economically efficient way
to advance the identified public interest.5 ' Third, it found the testing
policy to be minimally intrusive. Thus, the Fourth Circuit established

46. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
47. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990).
4& Id. at 452.
49. Id. For another illustration of Special Needs balancing test, see Skinner,
489 U.S. at 619.
50. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477 (pointing out that the government was not
required to have a need that was "compelling in the absolute sense").
51. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1996) (requiring
interest "important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other
factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation
of privacy." (Emphasis in the original ).
52. For further support of the government's interest, see Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88-89 (detailing findings of growth and
development, psychological and neurological harm to children from exposure to
cocaine in utero).
53. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 478 (describing "little doubt" that the policy
implemented by MUSC "was an effective way to identify and treat "maternal
cocaine use while conserving the limited resources of a public hospital"). See also
id. at 481 (finding proposed alternative practices would be prohibitively
expensive).
54. Id. at 479 (finding the context in which the urine sampling occurred
minimally intrusive since it was done "in the course of medical treatment to which
Appellants had consented ...[and] [t]he giving of a urine sample is a normal, routine
and expected part of a medical examination"). See also Yin v. California, 95 F.3d
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that the urine drug screens did not violate the Fourth Amendment as
unreasonable searches.5 The women appealed this affirmance of the
judgment against them to the United States Supreme Court.56
57
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
the Supreme Court considered

the case, presuming that the MUSC's policy impinged upon the
women's autonomy in that the urine testing was performed without the
women's consent. The Court also presumed that the primary purpose
of the testing was to provide the results to law enforcement,5 9 which
then used that information as evidence.60 The women were susceptible
to the threat of arrest and prosecution, 6' and the offense with which
each woman
would be charged depended upon the stage of her
62
pregnancy.

864, 870 (9h Cir. 1996) (stating that medical examinations routinely involve the
giving of a urine specimen).
55. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452. See also Skinner 489 U.S. at 619 (describing as
matter of degree of intrusion as material in determining reasonableness).
56. The women enjoyed the support of numerous groups, including the
American Civil Liberties Union, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Chicago Abortion Fund, and Americans for Democratic Action, see Brief of Amici
Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, et al., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532
U.S. 67. Cf. GEORGE P. SMITH, II, Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of
Biotechnology 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 93,94 (1999) (advocating
"a full partnership of interest and action should be sought by law, science, ethics,
and medicine if progress is to be achieved over the succeeding years" and
discussing the disabling effect of the emotionalism that often surrounds important
issues).
57. 532 U.S. 67.
58. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76.
59. Id. at 69.
60. Id. at 85-86.
61. Id. at 82-84 (describing the possibility that the threat of law enforcement
may have been intended as the means to a desired end of getting the women in
question into substance abuse treatment but describing the threat of law
enforcement means as the direct and primary purpose of MUSC's policy, i.e.,
contending that MUSC's primary purpose was not to help the women take
treatment).
62. Id. at 72-73 (detailing precise offenses with which a woman would be
charged: (1) 27 weeks or less gestation: simple possession; (2) 28 weeks or more:
possession and distribution to a person under the age of 18 (the fetus); (3)At
delivery: possession, distribution to a person under the age of 18, and unlawful
neglect of a child).
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and
remanded the case for a determination on consent. 63 Regarding
reversal of the lower court's exclusion of the case from the warrant
requirement, the Court reasoned that the urine drug testing performed
by the hospital did not meet the standard for the special needs
doctrine. The majority found that, because the applicable government
interest was the use of criminal sanctions as deterrence, MUSC's
"benign motives" were relegated to the significance of only a
secondary goal and that weighted the balancing test toward the
protection of autonomy.6
As to the issue of consent, the majority of the Court maintained that,
because the Court of Appeals had not discussed the issue, the more
prudent course for the Supreme Court was to express no view, thus
allowing the Court of Appeals to examine and resolve it.6 5
Justice Kennedy reviewed the Court's abdication on the consent
issue in his concurrence, acknowledging that the Court had "erected a
strange world for deciding the case, 66 by finding it "necessary to take
the unreal step of assuming there was no voluntary consent. ' 67 He
stated plainly that, had consent rather than nonconsent been assumed
for purposes of analysis, "the case might have been quite a different
one. "68
Justice Scalia took a strong stance in his dissent. 69 He stated clearly
that his assessment of the facts revealed no unconsented search. ° He
reasoned that the women provided the urine samples and gave express,
written consent to the testing. He further asserted that Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence does not require that the consensually

63. Id. at 86.
64. Id. at 85 (holding that MUSC's 'benign motive' "cannot justify a departure
from Fourth Amendment protections, given the pervasive involvement of law
enforcement with the development and application of the MUSC policy").
65. Id. at 77,(citing Glover v. United States 531 U.S. 198 (2001) and National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470 (1999)).
66. Id. at 91.
67. Id.

68. Id.
69. Scalia's willingness to take a strong stance merits consideration. See PHILIP
K. HOWARD, THE LOST ART OF DRAWING THE LINE 35-40 (2001) (citing 'The
Abdication of Legal Authority' for commentary on how striving for neutrality can
cause the inadvertent removal of a critical element of justice; quoting Oxford
philosopher P.S. Atiyah, " Legal principle [has been] rejected as a form of
authoritarianism").

70. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 96.
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searched party be informed of potential law enforcement
involvement. 71 Scalia contended that, even if the search had been
unconsented, under the circumstances the search would have been
valid under the special needs doctrine. Applying the special needs
balancing test Scalia characterized the government's intervention as
beneficent and necessary. He described the goal of the drug testing
policy as being intended to facilitate treatment and protect the mother
and the unborn child.72 On the other hand, he valued the impingement
on the women's Fourth Amendment rights as a less weighty concern,
and indeed found those rights undisturbed.73
Scalia's determination was sensible, considering the illegality of the
drug use and its ultimately negative impact on all of society. 4 Action
meant to curb the use of illegal substances, particularly by pregnant
citizens, can be anticipated to improve the health status of both the
mother and fetus which confers a benefit not only on them, but also on
the citizens whose taxes would be spent to correct drug-induced
problems.
Scalia identified the goal of the drug-testing program as the creation
of an incentive for the addicted women to take treatment for their
addiction. He described law enforcement as joined with the hospital
staff "in that benign purpose,"7 5 and punctuated his opinion with a
sardonic final statement: "It would not be unreasonable to conclude
that today's judgment, authorizing the assessment of damages against
the county solicitor and individual doctors and nurses who participated

71. Id. (citing Respondents Brief, Part 1I):
Petitioners.. .freely and voluntarily.. .provided the urine samples....[E]ach of the
Petitioners signed a consent to treatment form which authorized the MUSC
medical staff to conduct all necessary tests of those urine samples - including drug
tests .... [T]here is no precedent in this Court's Fourth amendment search and
seizure jurisprudence which imposes any.. .requirement that the searching agency
inform the consenting party that the results of the search will be turned over to law
enforcement.
72. Id. at 99 (citing the District Court's finding of fact and observing that this
finding is binding on the Court unless clearly erroneous, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
52(a)).
73. Id. at 92.
74. Shelley L. Beckmann, Ph.D., Address at the 123"d Annual Meeting of the
American Public Health Association (1992) (describing the influence of drug
abuse on crime and citing a 1992 report by the United States Department of
Justice that showed more than half of arrestees who were tested for drugs were
shown to have used drugs recently and that cocaine was the most prevalent drug
found).
75. Ferguson, 121 S.Ct. at 1302.
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Scalia's willing recognition of the compelling nature of the women's
need for care spotlights the real issue in the case, the need for
protective action on behalf of a uniquely vulnerable group of citizens.
But Scalia wrote in dissent, and the majority leaves the real problem
untouched.
A stringent but non-punitive policy is required to
intervene in the addictive process in order to protect the patients and
their fetuses from the health risks created by drug use during
pregnancy.
Analogous situations have been presented in recent history and
specialized policies have been adopted to benefit both the individuals
and society at large. For example, in 1986, the Department of Defense
tested all service members for HIV and questioned those who tested
positive about the manner in which they had contracted the virus.77 In
order to protect those who reported homosexual activity or needlesharing from adverse personnel action 78 a law was passed which
specifically restricts the Department of Defense's use of such
information.79 Similar legislative action can be tailored to allow
rigorous but nonpunitive intervention on behalf of other special
categories of patients such as those in the instant case.

II. THE PATIENTS
Often, America's poor find the use of illicit drugs to be a reliable,
affordable, albeit brief, 8° release from the troubles and worries which

76. Id.
77. Interview with John V. Sullivan, Dep. Parliamentarian, Office of
Parliamentarian, United States House of Representatives, former Counsel to the
House Armed Services Committee, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 4,2002).
78. Id. Adverse personnel actions included, among other things, court martial,
punishment, involuntary separation, demotion, denial of promotion and an
unfavorable entry in a personnel record.
79. Restriction on Use of Information Obtained During Certain
Epidemiologic-Assessment Interviews, Pub. L. No. 99-661, §705(c) division A, 100
Stat. 3904 (1986).
80. See Brief Profiles, supra note 8 Cocaine (explaining that cocaine is abused
because it induces "carefree feeling, euphoria, relaxation, in control" sensations,
but that "high lasts only about 5 to 20 minutes" and "may cause severe 'mood
swings' and irritability" and describing development of tolerance that causes
requirement of increasing doses to achieve desired effect). See also Substances of
Abuse - Brief Profiles, Crack (explaining that crack is abused because it induces
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are their constant companions." Also, in the United States, AfricanAmerican women are more likely to be poor than are white women or
males of either race.8 The high probability of lifelong poverty that
many young, black women face and the despair that such odds
engender are augmented by the higher likelihood that the AfricanAmerican female will end her education without completing high
school.8 3 Even if she does finish high school, her college prospects will
be often be hampered by SAT scores that are lower than those of most
white women or black or white males.84
Examining these statistics, one can imagine how women for whom
these statistics are predictors might see any attempt at escape as futile
and adopt the use of harmful drugs as a viable coping mechanism.
Indeed, Dr. Rand Conger, the Director of the Center for Family
Research in Rural Mental Health at Iowa State University of Science
and Technology, addressed the National Institute on Drug Abuse's
Prevention Research Working Group on the subject of drug use as
escapism.
The National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug
Information Reporter describes Conger with asserting that, for the
poor, "[u]sing drugs provides a means to escape; dealing can be an
alternative source of income. Often people suffering from economic
'
hardship feel that they have little to lose if the get involved in drugs."85
Once involved, however, they often develop dependencies and

"quick high, power, euphoria" sensations but that Crack is almost instantly
addictive, the desirable effects last only a few minutes, and there are more
hospitalizations per year resulting from crack and cocaine than any other illicit
substance).
81. Poverty Level By Race, supra note 1.
82. Id. Not only are black females statistically more likely to live in poverty,
but the proportion of black females-nearly half of those under 18 and more than
one third of all -who will live in poverty is staggering. Id.
83. Id. at Educational Attainment of Persons 25 to 34 Years of Age, By Race
& Gender, 1995 (indicating high school graduation or more education was
obtained by 84.7% of black females, compared with 93.1% of white females,
91.7% of white males, and 86.1% of black males).
84. Id. at SAT Scores By Race & Gender, 1996 (indicating Verbal/Math SAT
scores for black females 437/416; compare with 524/507 for white females; 528/542
for white males; 431/431 for black males).
85.

The National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information, supra note
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addictions that preclude the capacity to choose whether or not to
continue to use drugs. 86
With an informed view of the socioeconomic influences of substance
abuse, one can recognize that the inequitable fate of poor women
produces the disparity between the rates of cocaine use during
pregnancy by African-American (4.5%) white (0.4%) and Hispanic
women (0.7%).Y To abandon those women and their fetuses to
poverty and addiction in the name of protecting the right to be left
alone would be a disastrous distortion of the values that generated the
Fourth Amendment to our Constitution.
III. WHAT IS CONSENT?
A. Consent to Urine Drug Testing Makes a Search Per Se Reasonable

Patients in American health care settings routinely provide urine
specimens to health care professionals for analysis,n and on occasion
those samples are used as legal evidence. 8' Nearly always and
necessarily, the samples are provided with the patient's unequivocal
and documented consent. 90 When the government obtains information

86. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 12, describing the addictive
nature of cocaine.
87. Robert Mathias, NIDA Survey Provides First National Data on Drug Use
During Pregnancy, NIDA Notes Women and Drug Abuse. Vol. 10, Number 1
(January/February 1995), available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/NIDANotes/
NNvollON1/NIDASurvey.html (also showing that, "overall, 11.3% of AfricanAmerican women, 4.4% of white women, and 4.5% of Hispanic women used illicit
drugs while pregnant. While African Americans had higher rates of drug use, in
terms of actual numbers of users, most women who took drugs while they were
pregnant were white").
88. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY [hereinafter MERCK
MANUAL] (Robert Berkow, M.D. et al. eds., 16' ed. 1992) (recommending
laboratory testing of various body fluids for diagnostic purposes); Yin v.
California, 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9 " Cir. 1996) (observing that "in today's world, a
medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would
be unusual").
89. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
665 (1989).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1584 (10' Cir. 1997)
(holding that evidence obtained by a consent-based search is admissible only if the
government (1) produces clear and positive testimony that the consent was
unequivocal, specific, and freely given, and (2) proves that the consent was given
without duress or coercion, express or implied.)
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from a citizen through a consented search, 9' the government must be
able to prove that the consent was genuine. 92 Furthermore, the quality
of that consent will merit scrutiny if the Constitutional rights of the
individual consenting could be affected.93

The author of this Note contends that the women consented to urine
drug testing. Even if consent cannot be proven, however, a compelling
argument can be made that the testing was reasonable to protect the
public interests in the health of the mother and fetus. However, the
consent to testing given by the women was applicable only within the
confidential health care setting. The consent to urine drug testing did
not extend to the dissemination of the results of the urine test to law
enforcement.
B. Nonconsensual Testing
1. When Is a Urine Drug Screen a Search?
There are some occasions when a urine specimen may lawfully and
permissibly be extracted from a patient without his or her consent.94
Such an event constitutes a search when it is executed by a state actor9'

91. United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 988 (holding as in Glover that for
consent-based search, "the government must show that there was no duress or
coercion, express or implied, that the consent was unequivocal and specific, and
that it was freely and intelligently given.").
92. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 89
(Date?). 1 John Wesley Hall, Jr. Search and Seizure, § 8:1 at 382 (2d ed. 1991)
(The ultimate question in any consent search is whether the consent was
voluntary). See also id. at §§ 8:12 - 8:30.
93. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (asserting that
virtually without exception, "the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver
has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a
criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.").
94. See MERCK MANUAL, supra note 88. The manual recommends that
physicians order certain laboratory testing in emergent situations, regardless of
consciousness of patient.
95. United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9" Cir. 1990) (analyzing the
expansion of Fourth Amendment beyond its usual application to conduct of law
enforcement and describing the assessment of Fourth Amendment implications of
the actions of non law enforcement. "To determine applicability of Fourth
Amendment, court must: (1) gauge whether the acting party intended to assist the
government in search or seizure activities which implicates the Fourth
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or his agent 96 with the intention that the patient will be subjected to
subsequent law enforcement investigation. 7
In the instant case, a distinction can be drawn between the
compulsory removal of body fluids for testing purposes, and the
voluntary provision of a body fluid specimen that requires no physical
penetration or contact.98 The compulsory removal of fluids is a search
subject to the Fourth Amendment, but voluntary provision is not
similarly protected.
The women provided the urine with the
expectation that the specimen would be tested and the results would
be used to foster the health of themselves and their fetuses. 9
2. Reasonable Suspicion Doctrine
Any governmental search must be reasonable to be constitutional'00
and government is normally prevented by this reasonableness
constraint from conducting searches in the absence of individualized
suspicion.0 1 The United States Supreme Court has held that a court
must balance the "intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests ' 2
in order to determine the reasonableness of a search.
In the instant case, MUSC, as a government agent, conducted the
urine drug testing out of concern for the well being of both mother and

Amendment, or (2) whether that party possessed a motive independent of
government's objectives"). Id.
96. United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9" Cir. 1981)(holding that act of
airline employee with sole purpose to support Drug Enforcement agent is
government act).
97. Attson, 900 F.2d at 1430-31 (describing that, "under proper factual
circumstances" government activity that furthers investigatory or administrative
purposes falls within the scope of the Fourth Amendment). Cf Dimeo v. Griffin,
943 F.2d 679 (7h Cir. 1991) (indicating that reduced privacy concerns accompany a
urine drug test that is conducted in the course of a medical examination).
98. Michael T. Flannery & Raymond C. O'Brien, Mandatory HIV Testing of
ProfessionalBoxers: An UnconstitutionalEffort to Regulate A Sport that Needs to
Be Regulated, 31 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 409, 459 (1998) (discussing personal liberty
and the Fourth Amendment in blood testing for HIV).
99. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 486 (describing how women signed consent forms for
urine testing).

100. Acton, 515 U.S. at 652 (reasoning that reasonableness
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search").
101.
102.

Chandler,520 U.S. 305.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440

U.S. 648, 654 (1979).

is the "ultimate
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fetus.'0 3 Ideally, the reasonableness of a search is assured by the
judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. °4 However, recognized
exceptions do exist. Under the Special Needs Doctrine, compelling
governmental needs allow a search conducted in the absence of
suspicion or probable cause.
3. Special Needs Doctrine Exception to Warrant Requirement

Between 1989 and 1997, the United States Supreme Court
considered a series of cases, all of which challenged the
constitutionality of the acquisition and testing of non-consensually
obtained urine specimens.
In the aggregate, these cases created the
Special Needs Doctrine,' °7 which defines a narrow exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for cases in which a special
governmental
• 108need for intrusion outweighs the individual's privacy
expectations.
It is generally well accepted that when a sample or
specimen is extracted from a patient without consent, the scope of the
search of that patient is extended beyond the acquisition of the sample
to the subsequent testing of the sample obtained.' ° Therefore, in
Ferguson, both the specimen and its subsequent testing were a part of

103. For a discussion of the best interests of children when parental care is in
question, see Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of
Children Versus Parents,26 CONN. L. REV. 1209 (1994).
104. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
105. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
106. See Chandler,520 U.S. 305; Acton, 515 U.S. 646; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617;
and Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656.
107. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477-79 (describing three-prong test for Special Need
Doctrine applicability: (1) Governmental need "important enough to justify the
particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be
relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy." (See Chandler, 520
U.S. at 318). (2) Effectiveness of the search, with focus on "the degree to which
[it] advances the public interest." (See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453). (3) Degree of
intrusion, measured objectively by the duration and intensity of the seizure and
investigation, and measured subjectively by the amount of fear and surprise
experienced by the searched or detained person. (See Sitz at 452).
108. Id. (identifying the Special Needs Doctrine and showing that, under that
doctrine, the screening of urine obtained by state agents from an involuntary
subject is routinely treated as a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment).
109. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 93 fnl (dissenting with outcome of case, but agreeing
that, when the provision of the urine specimen is involuntary, the subsequent
testing of the urine can be considered to have been infected by the search that
yielded the specimen).
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the search for Fourth Amendment purposes. The documented results
of the test were then made a part of each patient's record.
In the instant case, the motive of the MUSC staff in testing the
women's urine was the legitimate concern for the safe pregnancy and
delivery of the mother and fetus. Viewed from the medical, rather
than the law enforcement vantage point, the urine drug testing
qualifies for exception under the special needs doctrine." Indeed, one
of the Ferguson appellants has died since the case was filed,'
illustrating the seriousness of the health concerns the staff of MUSC
sought to address.
The dissemination of the positive findings to law enforcement,
however, was a separate act, the legitimacy of which turns on whether
law enforcement used the information to punish or protect and assist
the patients.1 2
It is arguable that law enforcement used the
information to motivate or coerce the women to take treatment for
addiction, but the punitive character of arrest for failure to comply is
indisputable.
C. Analysis of Consent
1. The Presumptions
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,"3 the stance from which the
Supreme Court considered the facts was critical to the outcome of the
case. The Court presumed first that the women had not consented to
urine drug testing, 4 and second that the primary purpose of the urine
testing was to obtain evidence for law enforcement."' The facts of the
case, however, challenge the validity of these presumptions.

110. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477-79.
111. Ferguson, 186 F.3d. at 485.
112. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69 (identifying the issue of consent as material to the
reasonableness of a search that yields evidence of criminal conduct because of the
threat of law enforcement action).
113. Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67.
114. Id. at 1288 (reasoning that, "given the posture in which the case comes to
us, we must assume for purposes of our decision that the tests were performed
without the informed consent of the patients...").
115. Id. at 1284 (stating that the case required the determination of whether "a
state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's
criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable search if the
patient has not consented to the procedure").
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Regarding the first presumption of non-consent, the women
manifested their consent when they signed the authorization for urine
drug testing.1 6 These women further manifested their consent through
their conduct when they provided the MUSC staff with the physical
specimen required for the test."' They did not, however, give consent
to the disclosure of their medical records to law enforcement.
Regarding the second presumption that the testing was performed to
obtain evidence for law enforcement, a distinction must be noted. The
MUSC staff engaged law enforcement's coercive power, but it did so to
control the women's access to drugs, and not to facilitate prosecution
for prosecution's sake.""
2. The Wrong Done

Although the women consented to urine testing, they did so without
knowledge of the potential dissemination of the test results to law
enforcement."9 Courts have found the dissemination of the results of a
consensual search to law enforcement to be in keeping with Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, even when government extracts the
consent without identifying itself.20 It logically follows that any attack

116. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 486 (describing how, although the women signed
consent forms for urine testing, they were not advised that the results would be
disclosed to law enforcement).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 474 (stating that "the impetus behind the policy came from Nurse
Shirley Brown, a case manager in the obstetrics department at MUSC;" and was
motivated by a perceived rise in cocaine use by maternity patients and by the wish
to prevent the negative health consequences of that use in the babies born to those
patients).
119. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77 (describing the hospital's contention that the
presence of indicia of drug abuse justified turning over test results to law
enforcement without the knowledge or consent of the patients). See Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870, 875-877 (1987) (determining that a warrantless
search based on reasonable grounds is justified by the state's special needs even if
evidence gained is used to support a criminal conviction); and Sitz 496 U.S. at 455
(reasoning that arrest for driving under the influence can result from suspicionless
stop at a sobriety checkpoint).
120. Cf Chandler, 520 U.S. 305; Acton, 515 U.S. 646; Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; and
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (creating the Special Needs Doctrine and treating drug
testing of urine that was obtained without consent as a search) with Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that a consent allowing access to
evidence is not vitiated by the failure on the part of a government agent to disclose
his role as informant). See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)
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on the dissemination of the results of the urine testing to law
enforcement must be severed from the search.
Indeed, the women themselves separated the search from the
dissemination and challenged the disclosure of information contained
in their medical records as discriminatory and a violation of their right
to privacy.'21 The women confronted the policy as disproportionately
affecting African Americans because it tested only122for cocaine, only at
MUSC, and only in certain departments of MUSC.
The appellate court found that MUSC had answered these assertions
with a legitimate explanation: MUSC wished to intervene upon an
increase in cocaine use in pregnant women, and the cost of alternative
practices suggested to lessen the discriminatory impact of the policy
would have been "prohibitively expensive.' ' 123 The appellate court also
noted that there existed "no evidence in the record to support a
conclusion
that MUSC could have forced other hospitals to adopt the
24
policy."
In assessing the violation of the women's right privacy, the appellate
court took into account the private nature of the disclosure and found
that the government's interest outweighed the women's privacy
interests."' The court reasoned that, although there is no "general
constitutional right to privacy,', 26 there is a recognized constitutional
"interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters ' 1 7 when such
disclosures involve rights that "are fundamental or implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."' 8 The appellate court decided, however,
that the interest of the government outweighed the women's interest in
nondisclosure of their medical records.1 29
In other words, the

(reasoning that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was judicially fashioned
to deter unlawful police conduct and the derivative use of the results of a search
raises a question not of rights, but of remedies).
121. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 481-82.
122. Id. at 480-81.
123. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 480.
124. Id. at 477-79.
125. Id.
126. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 464 (4' Cir. 1998).
127. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
128. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. See Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 684 (6" Cir. 1998) (holding that when a
constitutional right of privacy attaches to personal information, disclosure does not
violate the Constitution when "the government's interest in disseminating the
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disclosure of the women's urine drug test results passed the test for
constitutionality"' as long as the governmental interest was compelling
and appropriate.
3. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court's analysis of the case may be viewed as a
confounding permutation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
Court's decision could carve out an area of nonconsent that turns not
on whether the individual consented to the search, but rather revolves
around whether that individual anticipated the full consequences of
the evidence that consent would reveal. 31 In other words, the Supreme
Court's analysis may clarify the scope of consent when evidence can be
extracted from the by-product of a search.
Although case law supports the transfer of the product of a search to
law enforcement, 32 it does not so clearly support the transfer of the
results of that product's evaluation and interpretation. As a matter of
fact, in many jurisdictions, an argument could be made that, by
providing law enforcement with the test results from the patient's
medical record, the physician-patient privilege is violated. 33 South
Carolina has chosen not to protect the physician-patient relationship in
this way,'34 but has enacted a law making a woman who ingests cocaine
after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy guilty of distribution of a

information" outweighs "the individual's interest in keeping the information
private").
130. A circuit split exists on the issue of whether medical records can be
protected by the individual's right to privacy. Cf Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp.
Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1137 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating the individual has a constitutionalh
right to privacy of medical records) with Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6'
Cir. 1995) (holding that there exists no constitutionally protected right to privacy
in medical records).
131. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 93 (dissenting, Scalia states "[ujntil today, we have
never held - or even suggested - that material which a person voluntarily entrusts
to someone else cannot be given by that person to the police, and used for
whatever evidence it may contain").
132. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 1284.
133. Thomas R. Malia, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statute
Limiting Physician-Patient Privilege in Judicial Proceedings Relating to Child
Abuse or Neglect, 44 A.L.R. 4th 649 (1986). The physician-patient privilege is
intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a full
disclosure to the physician.
134. See, e.g., Peagler v. Atlantic Coast R.R. Co., 101 S.E.2d 821 (1958).
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controlled substance to a minor, 13 5 so no such argument could be made
in Ferguson.
The Supreme Court's Ferguson decision can be viewed as not only
remanding the issue of consent but also the issue of drug abuse and its
effect on society to the "laboratory of the states. '
Clearly, South
Carolina has a mandate to resolve this issue in this particular case, and
it follows that the state's policy must adhere to the findings on remand.
The social and health problems identified in Ferguson are not unique
to South Carolina. The problem of drug abuse, particularly during
pregnancy, deserves attention and redress throughout the United
States.
Fortunately,
members of the
United States House
of
Representatives are currently attempting to safeguard the health of
mothers and babies. Consequently, the states are being afforded an
opportunity for synergistic effort with the federal government.
On July 24, 2001, Rep. Lowey introduced the Mothers and
Newborns Health Insurance Act of 2001 which would to expand the
availability of coverage of pregnancy-related assistance for targeted
low-income women.'37 The proposed Act is now with the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce. The bill not only proposes
optional coverage for uninsured pregnant women under a state child
health plan, but also would provide automatic assistance to a child
born of that pregnancy for at least the first year of his or her life. 3 9
With concerted legislative and administrative effort, a mechanism
could be tailored to afford women treatment during pregnancy for
drug addiction.
IV. THE HEALTH CARE RATIONALE FOR THE URINE DRUG TESTING
POLICY

135. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-440 (2002).
136. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (describing the States'
right to experiment in social and economic government, and cautioning that the
Court's "[d]enial of the right...may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation").
137.
138.
139.

H.R. 2610, 107th Cong (2001).
Id. at §2.
Id. at §3(f).
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A. ErroneousPresumptions

In assessing the health care needs of the patients, MUSC's staff did
not assume that the women involved proactively chose to expose their
fetuses to harmful substances in utero. Rather, they surmised that the
women's use of harmful drugs during pregnancy was not an exercise of
autonomy, but instead a manifestation of the women's inability to
refrain from ongoing drug use due to the effects of the drugs
themselves. Accordingly, the primary purpose of the testing was not
that which was presumed by the Supreme Court but rather was a
special need to care for the drug addicted mothers and their fetuses.
This case, therefore, qualified for application of the Special Needs
Doctrine."' The need to assist and protect both mother and fetus was
compelling, especially after considering the negative physical and2
neurological effects of maternal cocaine use on developing fetuses.'1
The drug testing and substance abuse treatment could reasonably be
expected to be effective,'4 ' and testing the urine, which would have
otherwise have been discarded, was minimally intrusive.'4
The ultimate wrong suffered by the women suffered was not the
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights - those rights were

140. See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477-78 (describing policy development caused by

"alarming increase" in cocaine-affected pregnancies complications at MUSC and
concluding that "MUSC officials unquestionably possessed a substantial interest in
taking steps to reduce cocaine use by pregnant women."). Cf.Acton, 515 U.S. at
661-662 (concluding that the interest in preventing and deterring drug use by
schoolchildren was important in view of the drug use's negative effects).
141. See,supra note. ????
142.

Ferguson, 532 US at 89-90, citing CHIRIBOGA, ET AL. DOSE RESPONSE

EFFECT COCAINE EXPOSURE ON NEWBORN NEUROLOGIC FUNCTION, 103 Pediatrics

79 (1999) (detailing "higher rates of intrauterine growth retardation, smaller head
circumference, global hypertonia, coarse tremor, and extensor leg posture"), also
citing ARENDT, ET AL., MOTOR DEVELOPMENT OF COCAINE-EXPOSED CHILDREN
AT AGE TWO YEARS 103 Pediatrics 86 (1999) (noting that exposure to cocaine
antenatally "can also result in developmental problems which persist long after
birth).
143. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 478 (describing "little doubt" that the policy
implemented by MUSC "was an effective way to identify and treat maternal
cocaine use while conserving the limited resources of a public hospital").
144. Id. at 479 (finding the context in which the urine sampling occurred
"minimally intrusive" since it was done "in the course of medical treatment to
which Appellants had consented...[and] [t]he giving of a urine sample is a normal,
routine and expected part of a medical examination").
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vindicated by the Supreme Court. Rather, the women were wronged
through the cursory application of the Fourth Amendment as a means
of dismissing their need from the consciousness of society.
Although the women walked freely out of the hospital, they walked
straight back into poverty and drug dependence to assume their
hopeless positions in society. Their unhappy situation was now
compounded by the profound responsibility of a newborn who may
have had neurological side effects from in utero drug exposure. 145 Such
side effects commonly cause the baby to be irritable, tense and fussy
which in turn predetermines a difficult, demanding, and unrewarding
neonatal period that significantly interferes with maternal child
bonding. 4 6 The care of neurologically-affected newborns can be
extremely difficult and exhausting. Many state social services agencies
recognize this fact and provide respite care to allow the parents of such
children some time to recharge 147 even when those parents have
supportive and available family members. The women in Ferguson
could access such services only if their infants were identified as
diagnosis of the
requiring special care through identification and 148
abnormality in the infants' neurological development.
B. Standard Maternal Child Health Care
The staff at MUSC knew that the women were risking their
pregnancies by abusing cocaine. They also had first hand knowledge
of the impact of that abuse on the fetuses the women were carrying.
Contrary to the contention of the majority of the court in Ferguson,
the absence of documented change in the women's prenatal or
newborn care plans 149 does not equate to a primary focus on law
enforcement. Routine maternal and child health nursing care has long
included an assessment of the medication (legal and illegal) consumed

145. See CHIRABOGA supra note 142.
146. Scott J. Turner, Maternal Exposure to Crack Cocaine Produces Stressed
Newborns available at http://www.brown.edu/Adminstration/George-StreetJournal/newborns.html
147. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-21-60 (2000).
148. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-22-10(9) (2000).
149. Ferguson, 532 U.S. 73 (describing MUSC's intervention plan for women
whose urine drug test is positive as consisting only to substance abuse treatment
and making no mention of any change in the prenatal care or special care for the
women's newborns).
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by the pregnant woman."O Indeed, substance abuse is considered a
medical problem that creates risk in any pregnancy."'
In a clinical, organizational sense, documentation of patients'
treatment plans do not belong in MUSC's urine drug testing policy and
exclusion of those plans from that document does not equate to the
absence of any such plan, as the Court suggests. 52 On the contrary,
maternal child health units routinely include specific risk assessment
tools in every patient's individual chart. Furthermore, those tools
characteristically include substance use or abuse as a major factor for
high risk prenatal or labor and delivery care. 153 The primacy of
MUSC's concern for the health of their female patients was
demonstrated by MUSC's adherence to medical standards for
documentation rather than those for law enforcement.
Further supporting the inference that MUSC's policy documentation
was adequate if not excellent is MUSC's 1997 receipt of Accreditation
with Commendation from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations. 1 4 Accreditation with Commendation is an
honorable recognition that is assigned only to facilities with exemplary
clinical organization, including assessment and treatment planning that
is integrated into its labor and delivery unit's daily operation.
Accepting, for the sake of argument, that the primary purpose of
MUSC's drug testing policy was to assist law enforcement, the
assertion of a Fourth Amendment violation suggests that the women
exercised free and healthy choice to expose the fetuses they intended

150.

SALLY B. OLDS ET AL., OBSTETRIC NURSING

151.

SAN

DIEGO

&

IMPERIAL

COUNTIES

288,374-377 (1980).

REGIONAL

PERINATAL

FUNDAMENTALS OF LABOR, DELIVERY & RECOVERY NURSING,

SYSTEM,

Antepartum Care

and Assessment 55 (1999).
152. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. 82 (describing MUSC's policy as making no
mention, other than offering substance abuse treatment to the women).
153. SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL COUNTIES REGIONAL PERINATAL SYSTEM,
FUNDAMENTALS OF LABOR, DELIVERY & RECOVERY NURSING, Preterm Labor 10,
and 23 4 (1999) (describing a history of smoking or illicit drug use as predisposing
factors for puerperal infection).
154. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations,
Summary of Accreditation Information, Medical University of South Carolina
Medical
Center,
Accreditation
date
August,
1997,
available
at
http://www.Jcprdwl.jcaho.org/qualitycheck/pds/pds-org.asp.
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to carry to term and deliver155 to harmful substances. On the contrary,
the women's use of harmful drugs during pregnancy was not an
156
but rather was a manifestation of their
exercise of autonomy,
inability 57 to refrain from ongoing drug use 5 8 due to a dependency on
the drugs themselves. 59 The women were thus entitled to the health
care and treatment that is provided to those who are incompetent to
protect or care for themselves.'9 In other words, the women were in
of societal concern 16 and should not have been abandoned to
dire
theirneed
addictions in the name of protecting the right to be left alone.
V. SOCIO-MEDICALLY RESPONSIVE AND CONSTITUTIONALLY
RESPONSIBLE POLICY

155. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 1284. The court describes maternity patients who
were subjected to MUSC's drug testing policy were receiving prenatal treatment,
which implies the goal of fruition and delivery. Id.
156.

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICs 4

(3d ed. 1997) (defining autonomy as the principle that "independent actions and
choices of the individual should not be constrained by others"). (emphasis added).
157. Brain Research, supra note 10. The director of the National Institute on
Drug Abuse says drugs reset "the brain's pleasure circuits...you can't just tell an
addict, 'Stop,' anymore than you can tell a smoker 'Don't have emphysema.'
Starting may be volitional. Stopping isn't.")
158. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 485 (listing three women, one of whom is now
deceased, whose positive urine drug tests resulted in referral to substance abuse
counseling and subsequent return for maternity treatment with repeat positive
drug tests in all three).
159. Brief Profiles, Crack, supra note 8 (explaining that crack is abused because
it induces the sensations of a "quick high, power, euphoria." However, Crack is
almost instantly addictive, the desirable effects last only a few minutes, and there
are more hospitalizations per year resulting from crack and cocaine than any other
elicit substance).
160. FURROW, supra note 156, at 209 (delineating the principle of beneficence,
which declares that what is best for a person should be accomplished through both
non-malfeasance and recognition of the positive obligation to do that which is
good).
161. Id. at 209 (discussing ethical intrusion into the decisions of others and
recognizing that an individual may not want that which others have determined in
his interest and, in such a case, a conflict between autonomy and beneficence
results; also giving an example of "if we treat the continued life of a healthy person
to be in that person's interest, the values of autonomy and beneficence become
inconsistent when a healthy competent adult decides to take his own life").
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Although the Supreme Court viewed the goal of the urine testing
policy as primarily punitive, the ultimate goal of any new policy must
be the treatment of mother and fetus. 112 Modification of the MUSC
policy and development of any other policy directed at pregnant drug
abusers requires consideration of both the constitutionality of the
policy and the degree to which a need for societal intervention existed
in those to whom the policy was applied.
A. Constitutionality

In creating protection from intrusive government searches, the
Framers were motivated by a strong desire to safeguard liberty from
the unreasonable acts of law enforcement. 63 The Fourth Amendment
was intended to act as a mechanism for curbing law enforcement's
exercise of discretionary authority by making reasonable suspicion a
prerequisite to warrant issuance. 64 More specifically, the idea that
animated the Framers was the "right to be secure," not the right to
evade police. 161
In the case of the pregnant drug abuser, law enforcement's suspicion
was raised by the hospital staff's expression of concern, which was
itself supported by the divulgence of laboratory evidence. Such
reasonable suspicion resulting from the derivative use of the results of
a consented search is not the sort of intrusion the Fourth Amendment
was intended to prevent. The hospital's release of the women's
medical information, however, is not permissible under the Fourth
Amendment, and South Carolina can be expected to statutorily
recognize a physician-patient privilege should such a breach of patient
confidentiality result in criminal charges.' 66
B. Societal Need

The women used drugs, risking complications and injury to
themselves and their fetuses, despite the desire to give safe and healthy

162. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72 (describing threat of law enforcement as
"leverage" necessary for the success of the policy in getting women into treatment
and keeping them in treatment).
163. Carol S. Steicker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 820,837 (1994).
164. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 547, 552-557 (1999).
165.

166.

Id. at 750.
See supra note 127.
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birth. They were in need of intervention into their harmful, illegal
activity. The misplaced invocation of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence works to advance the protection of hospital patients
from law enforcement involvement generally, but simultaneously
prohibits societal intervention on behalf of these socio-economically
disadvantaged women whose maladaptive behaviors were fostered by
society's earlier failure to respond to their known risk for drug
dependence.
The application of the Fourth Amendment in this case must be
scrutinized within the context of American society. The use of drugs
during pregnancy affects not only the user and her fetus,'167 but also
those citizens whose taxes fund the provision of medical, vocational
and educational services to those who require them.'6 To champion
the right to be free absolutely from governmental intervention is to
champion rights without corresponding responsibility.
It is
disingenuous to claim any such right and simultaneously ignore the
attendant obligation to comply with the tenets of the society that
identified and protects these rights. 69 The women sought health care
funded through their state and provided through the state's agents, the
MUSC staff. Those agents identified and attempted to correct the
women's illegal activities that undermined or negated the care the
women themselves requested.
C. Societal Solution

The prognosis for recovery from cocaine dependence without
diligent treatment is grim, with half of all addiction patients relapsing
into drug use within a year of detoxification. 17° Although specialized
twelve-step cocaine and narcotic programs have been born of the
remarkably successful Alcoholics Anonymous program, it is generally
recognized by members of those groups that initial stabilization and
detoxification from cocaine, and especially crack, requires intervention

167. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 89 (detailing, in Justice Kennedy's concurrence,
findings of growth and development, psychological and neurological harm to
children from exposure to cocaine in utero).
168. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 46 (1991) (stating, "the independent
individualist, helmetless and free on the open road, becomes the most dependent
of individuals in the spinal injury ward").
169.

170.

Id. at 40-45.
Brain Research, supra note 10.
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that the twelve step programs are not designed to provide. 7 ' Success
has been noted, however, in patients who have received rigorous and
structured treatment.
Narconon, a substance abuse treatment that utilizes a "Purification
Program" developed by L. Ron Hubbard, 172 boasts a seventy-six
percent success rate in treating addiction and describes this as the
"highest in the nation."'' 73 There are, however, barriers to the use of
such a program. Most obviously, the $21,000 treatment cost 74 excludes
most Americans, including the women with whom Ferguson was
concerned. Additionally, the Narconon program involves mandatory
participation in program activities designed to instruct and adjust
patients in new methods of communication, ethics and integrity. 75
Treatment is available to patients whose criminal drug use has been
intervened upon by law enforcement. For example, the Department of
Justice utilizes special Drug Courts.176 Approximately 140,000 drug
dependent offenders have been enrolled in such programs since 1989
either still enrolled or have graduated
and seventy percent of them are
177
from the program successfully.
The Department of Justice Drug Court program requires that
participants obtain a GED, obtain and maintain employment and
remain current on all financial obligations. Moreover, participants are
subject to and comply with random urine drug screens. The program's
success is reflected in the births of over 750 drug free babies to drug
court participants. The program also touts the successful reunification

171. Telephone Interview with Scott S., 14 year Cocaine Anonymous member
(February, 2002).
172. L. Ron Hubbard, A Review of Scientific Literature Supporting the
Detoxification Method ("Purification Program"), Compiled by the Foundation for
Advancements in Science and Education (August, 1991).
173. Letter from Dena Boman, Intake Counselor, Narconon Arrowhead, to
Anne Kimbel, staff member, Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy (on
file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
174. NARCONON OF OKLAHOMA, INC. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION, DRUG AND
ALCOHOL REHABILITATION (2001).
175.

Id.

176. Looking at a Decade of Drug Courts, Drug Court Clearinghouse and
Technical Assistance Project, Drug Courts Program Office, Office of Justice
Programs, U.S. Department of Justice at http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/
spa/justice/publications/decadel.htm.
177.

Id.
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of hundreds of families and the realization
.- •. 178 of education and vocational
training goals for most of its participants.
Similarly, the city of San Diego holds monthly "Homeless court" in a
shelter for defendants, many of whom are Viet Nam Veterans, have
outstanding warrants for various, sometimes alcohol related,
infractions of the law. 9 San Diego's public defenders negotiate in
advance of the court session with the city prosecutor and the
defendants are typically receiving counseling or drug treatment before
they appear in the special court.
Such courts are springing up in the United States to "combine social
work with law by practicing therapeutic jurisprudence....some
individuals, such as drug addicts and the mentally ill, need treatment
more than jail time."18° Specialization is not new to American courts;
bankruptcy, immigration and military courts are well accepted. In
time, socio-legal specialty courts could become a uniquely viable
mechanism for dealing with socio-legal problems.
V. CONCLUSION

Justification for intervening upon drug abusers does not necessarily
require a negative result or judgment of these claimants. The negative
impact visited upon society from illegal drugs is sufficient to endorse
the use of "force in defense against another party who is a threat, even
though he is innocent and deserves no retribution.' ' 81 Indeed, such
activity is the function of public health entities, as Lawrence 0. Gostin
states in Public Health Law:

Public health law is the study of the legal powers and duties of the
state to assure the conditions for people to be healthy (e.g., to identify,
prevent, and ameliorate risks to health in the population) and the
limitations on the power of the state to constrain the autonomy,
privacy, liberty, propriety, or other legally protected interests of
individuals for the protection or promotion of community health.""
Thus, it is the province of public health entities to act within the
confines delineated by the members of the public to whom they answer
and, by so doing, choose the beneficent response to the individual drug

178.

Id.

179. Wendy N. Davis, Special Problems for Specialty Courts, 89 A.B.A. J. 32
(Feb. 2003).
180. Id. at 34.
181.

ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, UTOPIA 34 (1974). (PLEASE REVIEW)

182.

GOSTIN, supra note 21, at 4.
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users abuse of autonomy. Such intervention by public health agency
officials is all the more legitimate since their instruction is codified by a
democratic process.
In Ferguson, Justice Scalia attempted to derive a template from
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that would allow the Court to
decide the case in a manner that was consistent with previous case law.
Perhaps more significantly, however, Scalia pointed out that the case
required a social judgment, and that the Constitution is not the
appropriate tool for the settling of difficult societal questions. Rather,
Scalia would have the Court leave the "vast majority of [such
questions] to resolution by debate and the democratic process - which
would produce a decision by the citizens of Charleston, through their
elected representatives, to forbid or permit the police action at issue
here." '83 Considered pragmatically, the ultimate goal of healthy
mothers and babies will be realized only if women remain willing to
seek the care they need. A sound, rigorous, but nonpunitive policy is
therefore required.
The groundwork for such a policy has been laid. The State of South
Carolina has manifested its values through legislation requiring various
professionals to report medical conditions indicating a violation of the
law to authorities, 84 as well as through other statutory and judge made
law."" It is in the best interests of the patients and the common citizen
that the state's values be honored, so long as it is done in a manner that
respects each citizens individual rights and forwards the ultimate goal
of the policy.
There is room to speculate that health care intervention may be
welcomed by the women involved. Critics of state delivery of health
care contend that the emphasis on each state's autonomy in health
service plans results in inadequate care provided to ethnic
Americans.'8 Social service programs that intervene upon particular

183.

Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 92.

184. S.C. Code § 20-7-510 (2000); Persons Required or Permitted to Report;
Method; Confidentiality.
185. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (1997) (upholding a criminal child
neglect conviction of a woman who ingested cocaine while pregnant with a viable
fetus). See also State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984) (holding that a viable
fetus was a person for criminal law purposes).

186. See Vernellia R. Randall, Symposium: Does Clinton's Health Care Reform
Proposal Ensure Equality of Health Carefor Ethnic Americans and the Poor?, 60
BROOK. L. REV. 167, 180-182 (1994) (criticizing the emphasis on state's
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health problems have been implemented in Europe to successfully
protect the health and welfare of its citizens.l8
A balance must be struck, however, between beneficent oversight
and the respect for patient autonomy. The late Justice William J.
Brennan once wrote, "In The Republic and in The Laws, Plato offered
a vision of a unified society, where the needs of children are met not by
parents but by the government, and where no intermediate forms of
association stand between the individual and the State. This vision is a
brilliant one, but it is not our own. ' m
Indeed, each state within the United States, with its rich mix of
social, political, religious, and ethnic groups, must strive to discover
and apply necessary basic principles. 9 This can only take place
through investigation and thoughtful consideration of the benefits and
risks of potential courses of action. Each state is also challenged to
persist in the effort to achieve the ultimate and real goal of supporting
women specifically in their pursuit of safe and healthy pregnancy by
providing every woman all necessary health care, regardless of her
socioeconomic status.

autonomy in health service plans and describing the resulting inadequacy of care
provided to ethnic Americans).
187. GLENDON, supra note 162 (citing Casper, "Changing Concepts" and David
P. Currie, "Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights," 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864

(1986).
188. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 632 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. See K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS
54 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Leroy Walters eds., 3d ed. 1989).

